



JP 3-02, Joint Doctrine for Amphibious Operations



Purpose

- ✱ **Overview of Sea II War Game and ALMAR 006/01**
- ✱ **Current direction of JP 3-02**



Before we take off on JP 3-02....

✱ **Background**

✱ **Chapters:**

I - Concept

II - Command & Control

IV - Planning

**VII - Fire Support
Planning &
Coordination**





CNO/CMC Message

✳ **One year evaluation (01 Apr 00 to 01 Apr 01) of support relationship, IOT answer the following questions:**

- ♦ **Should JFC normally delegate OPCON to a component commander? Which one?**
- ♦ **What factors to determine supported commander at various points?**
- ♦ **Should OPCON, TACON, & support be options?**



CNO/CMC Message

- ♦ Should the CATF/CLF command relationship remain as an option?
 - ♦ Should the titles CATF/CLF be revised?
 - ♦ What should be the normal command relationship?
- ✱ OPNAV N3/N5, COMNAVWARDEVCOM, & CG, MCCDC tasked to capture lessons learned, after-actions, and other comments.




Sea II Seminar War Game Purpose

- ✱ **The purpose of the war game was to examine the impact of command relationship alternatives in amphibious operations at CPG/MEB-size and numbered Fleet/MEF level in a joint environment.**
- ✱ **In addition, this war game provided the command level forum to achieve decisions on game objectives and JP 3-02.**



Executive Session Seating

Mr. Glenny





Commanders' Comments at Sea II War Game

- ✱ **Need directives on how to fight the war, not how to parse doctrine**
- ✱ **Implicit trust among commanders**
- ✱ **Command relationships designed to provide flexibility & agility**
- ✱ **Education must address why these changes have been made**
- ✱ **“Spirit & Intent”**



Joint Amphibious Doctrine

- * **Amphibious operations normally part of joint operation**
- * **Must be “joint friendly” and sell the capabilities**
- * **Requirement?**
 - ♦ **CATF & CLF**
 - ♦ **AOA**
 - ♦ **Initiating Directive**





Amphibious Operation

Proposed: A military operation launched from the sea by Navy (**an ATF**) and landing forces, embarked in ships or craft, with the primary purpose of introducing the landing force ashore to accomplish an assigned mission.

Current: An attack launched from the sea by naval and landing forces, embarked in ships or craft involving a landing on a hostile or potentially hostile shore.

JP 1-02



Amphibious Operations

- ✱ **Assault**
- ✱ **Withdrawal**
- ✱ **Demonstration**
- ✱ **Raid**
- ✱ **Others ...**
 - ◆ **NEO**
 - ◆ **Humanitarian**





Amphibious Tasks

- **Attack adversary's critical vulnerabilities or control decisive points which lead to defeat of operational or tactical centers of gravity**
- **Seize a lodgment, to include ports and airfields, for the introduction of follow-on forces;**
- **Seize areas for the development of advanced bases;**
- **Destroy, neutralize, or seize enemy advanced bases and support facilities;**
- **Seize or conduct a preemptive occupation of areas which block free passage by adversaries;**
- **Provide afloat strategic, operational, or tactical reserve, to exploit opportunities and counter threats;**
- **Provide strategic, operational, or tactical deception, to force an adversary to defend along littoral areas; ...**



Order Initiating an Amphibious Operation

- Provide the establishing authority's mission, intent, and concept of operations
- Designate commanders, command relationships, and special instructions as required
- Designate assigned, attached, & supporting forces to the amphibious force
- Assign an operational area as appropriate
- Assign tasks
- Assign responsibility and provide necessary coordinating instructions for the conduct of supporting operations.
- Set target dates for execution of the operation
- Provide additional coordinating instructions, as required.



Control of Amphibious Forces

✱ **It is not desirable to prescribe a particular command authority**

- ♦ **Mission dependent**
- ♦ **Provide full spectrum of options**

✱ **Options JFC may pursue:**

- ♦ **Delegation of OPCON/TACON authority to Service/Functional Component.**
- ♦ **Establish a support relationship between**
 - **Service Component Commands**
 - **Functional Component Commands**
 - **Combination of Service/Functional CCs**
- ♦ **Establish subordinate JTF.**



OPCON JP 0-2

- * **Authoritative direction over all aspects of military operations and joint training necessary to accomplish missions**
- * **Normally provides full authority to *organize* & employ assigned forces**
- * **Suspend from duty & recommend reassignment of any officer assigned to the command**
- * **Does not, in and of itself, include authoritative direction for logistics or matters of admin, discipline, etc.**
- * **Commanders of subordinate commands and JTFs normally given OPCON of assigned or attached forces**



TACON JP 0-2

- * Give direction for military operations**
- * Control designated forces (e.g., ground forces, aircraft sorties, missile launches ...)**
- * Provides sufficient authority for controlling and directing the application of force or tactical use of combat support assets**
- * Does not provide organizational authority**
- * Typically exercised by functional component commanders over military capability or forces made available for tasking.**



Support: JP 0-2

- ✱ Established when one organization should aid, protect, **complement**, or sustain another force
- ✱ Important - conveys priorities
- ✱ By design, somewhat vague, but very flexible arrangement - **Establishing Directive**
- ✱ Establishing authority (common superior commander) responsible to delineate degree of authority



Establishing Directive JP 0-2

*** Normally issued to specify the purpose of the support relationship. Should include:**

- ♦ **Forces & other resources allocated to supporting effort**
- ♦ **Time, place, level, & duration of supporting effort**
- ♦ **Authority, if any, of supporting commander to modify supporting effort in event of exceptional opportunity or emergency**
- ♦ **Degree of authority granted to the supported commander over the supporting effort**



Establishing Directive JP 3-02

- Forces and other resources allocated to the supporting effort.
- Time, place, level, and duration of the supporting effort.
- Relative priority of the supporting effort.
- Authority, if any, of the supporting commander to modify the supporting effort in the event of exceptional opportunity or an emergency.
- Degree of authority granted to the supported commander over the supporting effort.
- Establishment of air, sea, and ground maneuver control measures
- Development of JTARs and ASRs
- Development of target noms, establishment of FSCMs, integration of air defense, and the role of the SACC ...



Supported/Supporting JP 0-2 Authority

Unless limited by establishing directive:

- * **Supportedu commander has authority to exercise general direction of supporting effort**
 - ♦ General direction includes designation & prioritization of targets or objectives, timing & duration of supporting action, & other instructions necessary for coordination & efficiency
- * **Supportingu commander determines forces, tactics, methods, procedures, & communications**
 - ♦ Supporting commander has responsibility to ascertain needs of supported force & take action to fulfill them within existing capabilities, consistent with priorities and requirements of other assigned tasks.



Shift in the Support Relationship

Examples of Shifts in the Support Relationship *

Mission

Assault

Raid with coastal threat

Inland Raid with no coastal threat

Demonstration

Withdrawal

Humanitarian Assistance

Supported Commander

CATF, then CLF

CATF, then CLF, then CATF

CLF

CATF

CLF, then CATF

CATF or CLF

* Actual supported-supporting commanders will be designated by the establishing authority based on the specific mission requirements.



Determining the Supported Commander

The following factors should be considerations, but are not all inclusive:

- ♦ **Mission**
- ♦ **Threat**
- ♦ **Type, phase and duration of operation**
- ♦ **Command and control capabilities**
- ♦ **Force capabilities**
- ♦ **Battlespace assigned**
- ♦ **Recommendation from subordinate commanders**




Command authority required?

	OPCON	TACON	SUPT
Organizational authority	X		
Assign tasks	X	X	
Control designated forces	X	X	
Give direction on priorities, timing, effects	X	X	X
Protect, sustain, aid, complement	X	X	X



Sea as Maneuver Space





CATF & CLF

Change Titles to Terms

- ✱ **Commander, amphibious task force (CATF) and commander, landing force (CLF) are no longer titles, but are descriptive doctrinal terms. The terms do not imply a command relationship and are used in doctrine solely to clarify the duties and responsibilities of these commanders.**
- ✱ **In exercises and operations, the commanders should be referred to by either their operational title (e.g., CG, 2d MEB) or a task force designator (e.g., CTF 62) .**



Titles to Terms

- ♦ **Amphibious Force (AF):** An Amphibious Task Force and a Landing Force together with supporting forces that are trained, organized, and equipped for amphibious operations
- ♦ **Amphibious Task Force (ATF):** A Navy task organization formed to conduct amphibious operations. Together with the Landing Force and supporting forces comprise the Amphibious Force.
- ♦ **Landing Force (LF):** A Marine Corps or Army task organization formed to conduct amphibious operations. Together with the ATF and supporting forces comprise the Amphibious Force.



Relationship within the amphibious force


✱ Based on the complementary, rather than similar nature and capabilities of the ATF and LF, typically a support relationship is established between the two commanders.

✱ It is not the intent, however, to limit the common superior's authority to establish either an OPCON or TACON command relationship as appropriate.



Operational Areas

**AO & HIDACZ
or
AOA**





Amphibious Planning Process

Top down & integrated planning and unity of effort
Six Steps

- * Mission Analysis**
- * COA Development**
- * COA Wargame**
- * COA Comparison & Decision**
- * Orders/OPGEN development**
- * Transition**





Primary Decisions

PRIMARY DECISION	May Be Contained In Initiating Order	Decision	Decision Made NLT Step
1. Determine Amphibious Force Mission(s)	X	MUTUAL	1
2. Select Amphibious Force Objectives(s)	X	MUTUAL	1
3. Determine Courses of Action for Development	X	MUTUAL	2
4. Select Course of Action		MUTUAL	4
5. Select Landing Areas		MUTUAL	4
6. Select Landing Beaches		MUTUAL	4
7. Determine Sea Echelon Plan		CATF	4
8. Select Landing Force Objectives		CLF	4
9. Select Landing Zones and Drops Zones		CLF	4
10. Select Date and Hour of Landing	X	MUTUAL	4




Fire Support Coordination

- * **(DOD, NATO) The planning and executing of fire so that targets are adequately covered by a suitable weapon or group of weapons.**
- * **SAC and FFC**
- * **Targeting effects**
- * **Emerging Navy land attack systems - assignment of ships to support role or apportionment/ allocation of rounds**



QUESTIONS?

<http://www.doctrine.usmc.mil>





Doctrine

The more generally stated that doctrine, the more flexible it will be in application to a wide range of situations, some of which may not have been anticipated. The more specific that doctrine, the greater its clarity - but at the cost of broad applicability. Thus, inevitably, doctrine is incomplete. Moreover, its actual applicability in any situation will be governed by the specifics of that situation ...

Chisholm, Negotiated Joint Command
Relationships, NWCR Spring 2000



Command Relationships

Basic fact remains that command relations in such operations are not governed entirely by doctrine; they are likely never to be solely a function of the imperatives of the military situation; and they will inevitably reflect interservice rivalries, intraservice rivalries, and strong personalities. Like many problems of organization, these are probably enduring and structural, matters that defy permanent solution. Doctrine goes along way toward resolving them, but in the end - in actual practice - it provides only a foundation for the informal processes of accommodation and adjustment that structure command relations.

Chisholm, Negotiated Joint Command Relationships, NWCR Spring 2000



History of JP 3-02

- * **08 Oct 92** JP 3-02 Revised and Approved
- * **27 Jul 95** JP 3-02 JWFC Post-Approval Assessment
- * **1996-97** LtGen Van Riper CG, MCCDC/Col Dobson (Doctrine) efforts
- * **05 Nov 97** JP 3-02 J-7 Program Directive for Revision
- * **Sept 98** CG MCCDC / DC/S PP&O re-energize
 - ♦ Draft Marine Corps position based on two 3-star VTCs
- * **21 Jan 99** 3 Star offsite brief to CMC
 - ♦ USMC position agreed
- * **26 Apr 99** DC/S PP&O(LtGen Steele) / N-3/5 brief
- * **23 Aug 99** OPNAV N51 provides Navy position to USMC
- * **Aug-Sep 99** OPNAV N51/NWDC reps meet w/PP&O & MCCDC
- * **Jan 00** CMC/CNO Agreement



Game Organization

Hosts/Oversight
USN
USMC

Gamen Control

Collection Team

OPFOR

Game Directors

**ADVISORY /
WHITE CELL**

LANT Cell
MEB/CPG Players
Moderator

SMEs
Facilitator
OPFOR
Collection Team

PAC Cell
MEF/FLT Players
Moderator

SMEs
Facilitator
OPFOR
Collection Team

Observers



Decisive Point JP 3-0 FC

- ✱ **A geographic place, specific key event, or enabling system that allows commanders to gain a marked advantage over an enemy and greatly influence the outcome of an attack. (Upon approval of this revision, this term and its definition will be included in JP 1-02.)**



Centers of Gravity

JP 3-0 FC

✱ Those characteristics, capabilities, or **localities sources of power** from which a military force derives its freedom of action, physical strength, or will to fight. Also called COGs. (Upon approval of this revision, this term and its definition will modify the existing term and its definition and will be included in JP 1-02.)



Decisive Points JP 3-0 FC

- ✱ There normally will be more decisive points in an operational area than JFCs can control, destroy, or neutralize with available resources. Accordingly, planners must analyze potential decisive points and determine which points enable eventual attack of the **adversary's** COGs. The commander designates the most important decisive points as objectives and allocates resources to control, destroy, or neutralize them.



Joint Operations Area (JOA)

- ✱ **Area of land, sea, & airspace, defined by a geographic combatant commander or subordinate unified commander, in which a JFC (normally a CJTF) conducts military operations to accomplish a specific mission.**
- ✱ **JOAs are particularly useful when operations are limited in scope and geographic area or when operations are to be conducted on the boundaries between theaters.**



AOA

- ✱ A geographical area, delineated **by the JFC**, for purposes of command and control within which is located the objective(s) to be secured by the **amphibious force**.
- ✱ This area must be of sufficient size to ensure accomplishment of the **amphibious force's** mission and must provide sufficient area for conducting necessary sea, air and land operations.



Area of Operations (AO)

- ✱ **An operational area defined by the JFC for land and naval forces. AOs do not typically encompass the entire operational area of the JFC, but should be large enough for component commanders to accomplish their missions and protect their forces. JP 1-02**



High Density Airspace Control Zone (HIDACZ)

- ✱ **Airspace designated in an ACP or ACO, in which there is a concentrated employment of numerous and varied weapons and airspace users. A HIDACZ has defined dimensions that usually coincide with geographical features or navigational aids. Access to a HIDACZ is normally controlled by the maneuver commander. JP 1-02**